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Information about objective probability of a lottery  
and the illusion of control 
Abstract: This paper investigates the effect of explicitly informing participants about the objective probability of winning 
a lottery on the illusion of control. In a procedure based on Experiment 3 from Langer’s 1975 seminal paper, 
participants were faced with lotteries based on familiar vs. unfamiliar stimuli and either explicitly informed about the 
objective probability of winning or not (the probability could be derived from other data). Results indicated that stating 
the objective probability of winning the lottery reduced, but not eliminated the illusion of control. Moreover, Langer’s 
effect of stimulus familiarity was not replicated. Experiment 2, which included a lottery based on the full set of Polish 
alphabet letters, confirmed the same effects. Results indicate that illusion of control may be explained by the control 
heuristic (Thompson et al., 1998) – in absence of explicitly stated probability, participants estimate their chances of 
winning based on perceived control, even though calculating the objective probability is possible.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The illusion of control was defined by Ellen Langer 
(1975) as an expectancy of a personal success probability 
inappropriately higher than the objective probability 
would warrant (p.313). Langer stated that illusion of 
control occurs because we mistakenly assume that random 
chance events are skill-based. Therefore we try to use this 
illusory skill to maximize our odds of success, even though 
in reality we don’t change them.  
The illusion of control is a subject of research in 
many contexts. As stated by Stefan and David in their 
meta-analysis (2013), the illusion of control is constantly 
present as an effect of several situational and psycholo-
gical factors, and tends to generate moderate to large effect 
sizes. The illusion of control is the subject of research in 
areas such as economic psychology, for example as 
a factor influencing the continuation of playing in the 
face of sustained losses (Cowley, Briley & Farrel, 2015) 
and neuropsychology, where its impact on the BOLD 
response during reward anticipation was studied (Lorenz 
et al., 2015). It is also considered to impact problem 
gambling (Moore & Ohtsuka, 1999; Ladouceur & Sévigny, 
2005). During gambling, many cognitive biases occur, 
such as the perceived ability to influence random chance 
games. This leads to the desire to continue gambling 
despite heavy losses. Ladouceur & Sévigny (op.cit.) noted 
that it would be possible to reduce problem gambling by 
preventing the illusion of control. For example, one could 
try explaining the mechanisms of random chance games so 
that gamblers know they have no actual control over them. 
Other research shows that illusion of control influences the 
development of gambling disorder (Stark, 2014) and 
is useful in predicting problem gambling (Ginakis 
& Ohtsuka, 2005). Recent empirical studies suggest that 
illusion of control is higher in disordered gamblers than in 
the general population (Wolfson and Briggs 2002; Myrseth 
et al. 2010; Orgaz et al. 2013).  
Research from the area of psychopathology indicates 
the presence of illusion of control in obsessive-compulsive 
disorder. Reuven-Magril et al. (2008) found that OCD 
symptoms were related to an increased self-reported sense 
of control. Similar results were obtained by Vassiliou 
(2014); OCD symptoms and the illusion of control were 
significantly positively correlated. On the other hand, 
Gillan et al. (2014) found that OCD patients made more 
accurate control judgements and thus felt weaker illusion 
of control compared to the control group. People suffering 
from OCD have a high need for control, and fear events 
they cannot control. Therefore they try to exert illusory 
control by means of compulsive behavior in order to 
reduce uncertainty. 
A lot of research investigates individual factors 
influencing the illusion of control, such as mood (Alloy 
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& Abramson, 1979) or need for control (Burger, 1986).
Relatively little research, however, concerned the under-
lying mechanisms of illusion of control. These mechan-
isms need to be investigated to understand the nature of
illusory control. One of the situational factors which
facilitated illusory control in Langer’s (1975) research was
stimulus familiarity. In her Experiment 3, participants took
part in a raffle lottery, where each participant received
a single lottery ticket out of 26, knowing that there would
be one winning ticket. In a 2x2 factorial plan, the tickets
were either chosen by participants or given to them at
random (choice vs. no choice), and contained either letters
of the alphabet or ‘esoteric symbols’ (familiar vs.
unfamiliar stimuli). Regardless of the condition, it was
easy to calculate that chances of winning are 1 in 26. Two
days before the raffle draw, an experimenter called the
participants and offered exchanging their raffle ticket for
a different one with a higher chance of winning (1 in 21).
Langer assumed that illusory control would prevent
participants from accepting this objectively favorable
exchange, which was indeed what happened – participants
were less likely to exchange tickets they chose themselves,
but also less likely to exchange tickets which had ‘familiar
stimuli’.
Langer’s paper falls short of explaining the mechan-
isms behind the illusion of control, focusing on select
factors which may cause it. Thompson, Armstrong
& Thomas (1998) proposed a very interesting explanation
of the illusion of control, called the control heuristic. They
assume that there exists a heuristic based on the inten-
tionality of the outcome (foreseeability, ability to produce
the effect, valence of the outcome) and perceived
connection (between the action and outcome). Illusion of
control is caused by an incorrect conclusion that one has
control over the situation, based on these antecedents. The
idea of control heuristic leads to a critical question – can
situational characteristics of (illusory) control be used to
estimate not only the degree of control, but also the pro-
bability of success? Heuristics are often responsible for
estimating the probabilities of different scenarios – this is
true for the availability heuristic, representativeness
heuristic, affect heuristic, anchoring bias, etc. Therefore
one could argue that individuals may estimate their odds
using their perceived control over a random chance game,
while ignoring objective probability. This would indeed be
similar to the mechanism of the representativeness
heuristic as described by Tversky & Kahneman, (1974,
p.3) – probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which A
is representative of B, i.e. by the degree of similarity
between them, whereas we are also insensitive to the prior
probability of outcomes (p.4). Basically, individuals may
consider a random chance game to be representative of
a controllable situation, and estimate their chances as if it
were controllable, while ignoring objective probability. Let
us call this the control heuristic and representativeness
hypothesis. Should this be the case, making objective
probability the focal point of the decision problem should
lead to reflective thinking (Langer 1993) i.e. force
participants to use an algorithm instead of the heuristic,
and therefore move the perceived chances of winning
toward objective probability. On the other hand, partici-
pants in a decision task which contains high illusory
control and no explicit information about probability,
should also overestimate objective probability of winning,
even though this probability is easy to calculate.
To investigate this theory, we used Langer’s (1975)
Experiment 3 and manipulated the presence of explicitly
stated objective probabilities of winning. Research on
gambling by Gaboury & Ladouceur (1989) indicated that
while 90% of participants in a neutral setting stated that
a game was completely random, 70% participants in-game
considered its results to be strategy. Behsain, Taillefer
& Ladouceur (2004) presented participants in a random
chance game either with neutral (irrelevant) information,
or with statements reminding them that the game is ran-
dom and unpredictable. Participants who received these
reminders were less likely to make cognitive errors, and
were less motivated to continue playing the game. These
results indicate that information which causes reflection
may reduce illusory control, and allow more accurate es-
timates of chances.
Reflection was researched in the context of illusory
control by Bouts & Van Avermaet (1992). They asked
participants to bet on drawing a higher card than the
experimenter. Cards contained either familiar or unfamiliar
stimuli. Participants were either asked to first estimate
their chances and then bet, or to first bet and then estimate
their chances. If betting was preceded by an estimate of
chances, participants bet more when the stimulus was
familiar. Moreover, estimating chances prior to the bet
reduced the bet size . Results indicate that the request for
a probability estimate caused reflection on the actual
chances and therefore led to a reduction of the bet, which
may have coincided with a reduction of illusory control.
To sum up, we wanted to investigate whether
providing explicit information about the objective chances
of winning (as opposed to providing the same information
only by stating the number of lottery tickets, which would
require simple calculation) would reduce illusory control
measured as one’s own perceived chances of winning.
Should this information not influence the results, it would
mean that participants are more or less aware of the
objective chances, but overestimate their own chances
based on the illusory ‘skill’ or ‘personal luck’ components
of the situation. This would be consistent with existing
interpretations of illusory control (Langer, 1975; Wohl
& Enzle, 2003, 2004). If, on the other hand, stating
objective probability would eliminate or reduce the illu-
sion of control, it would mean that participants are either
unaware of, or ignore this probability, and instead estimate
their chances based on the control heuristic or representa-
tiveness. In the latter case, we would expect participants to
overestimate the objective probability of winning when
explicit probability is not stated. We also investigated the
locus of control (Rotter, 1966) in Experiment 1, and self-
-esteem and narcissism in Experiment 2, as potential
correlates of illusion of control.
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EXPERIMENT 1
The experiment was based on Langer’s (1975)
Experiment 3 on stimulus familiarity. We manipulated
stimulus familiarity and explicitly presented objective
probability in a 2x2 between-subjects design. We then
measured the participants’ perceived chances of winning
(‘how much do you believe that you will win the lottery’)
and their stated objective probability of winning (‘what is
the objective chance that someone will win the lottery’). In
line with the control heuristic and representativeness
hypothesis, we expected that explicitly presenting the
objective probability of winning would reduce the
participants’ perceived chances of winning compared to
the condition where objective probability was not pre-
sented. Moreover, we expected that participants’ state-
ments regarding the objective probability of winning
would be much higher than the actual probability of 4%
(1 in 25), even though this probability was easy to cal-
culate from the number of tickets (25) and the number of
winning tickets (1). We also expected to obtain Langer’s
effect of stimulus familiarity on illusory control, which
based on the control heuristic and representativeness
hypothesis should be weaker or absent in the condition
where objective probability was presented. As an addi-
tional measure, we investigated the potential relation
between Locus of Control (LoC) and the perceived
chances of winning. Locus of Control is defined as "ge-
neralized expectancies for internal versus external control
of reinforcement". LoC is a broader concept than the
illusion of control (which is only situational), and is an
attribution of control, i.e. a conclusion about the cause of
control. We assumed that participants with internal locus
of control may exhibit a stronger illusion of control, as
demonstrated e.g. by Benassi, Sweeney & Drevno (1979)
and Friedland, Keinan & Regev (1992).
Participants
One-hundred and twenty students (98 women and
22 men, aged 18-28 (M = 21.67, SD = 1.75) at the
Jagiellonian University in Krakow were recruited on
university grounds by means of direct contact outside
classes. Participants were volunteers, informed that they
may take part in a short experiment regarding lotteries in
which they may win a small amount of money. No
exclusion criteria were set, participants were randomly
assigned to treatments. Informed consent was obtained
from all participants.
Materials and procedure
The experiment used a raffle lottery with a fixed
probability of winning (4%). Participants were presented
with twenty-five cards (face up), containing either letters
of the alphabet (familiar stimuli) or runes (unfamiliar
stimuli). A computerized procedure in PsychoPy (Peirce,
2007) was used to provide instructions and raffle the
winning card. Participants were informed on-screen that
they should choose one of the 25 cards and that the
computer would then randomly select one winning card
from the same set. If the participant’s card matched the
selected card, they would win 5 PLN (exchange equivalent
of $1.31, Big Mac Index perceived value of $4.80). After
the participants selected their cards, they were asked on-
screen to estimate ‘how much do you believe that you will
win the lottery’ using a slider from 0% to 100%, and then
the computer randomly selected the winning card. Sub-
sequently, on a separate sheet of paper, participants were
asked to fill out Rotter’s I-E locus of control scale (Rotter,
1966; Polish adaptation by H. Olearnik in: Drwal, 1995)
and to state what the objective probability of winning the
lottery was (‘what is the objective chance that someone
will win the lottery’).
In the two treatments where objective probability was
stated, there was an additional sentence presented on-
screen along with the instructions, in bold red text on black
background, stating that ‘the objective probability of
winning this lottery is 4%’. The total duration of the
experiments in all conditions varied between 10-15 mi-
nutes, depending mostly on the time required to fill out the
I-E scale. Participants were subsequently debriefed.
RESULTS
The explicitly stated information about probability
reduced participants’ perceived chances of winning (M =
40.05%, SE = 3.40 vs M = 21.62%, SE = 2.53; F(1,116) =
18.57, p < .001, η² = .138). No significant effect of
stimulus familiarity was found (M = 30.45%, SE = 3.06 vs
M = 31.22, SE = 3.39; F = .032, p = .858, η² < .001) nor
was the interaction effect Information * Familiarity
significant (F(1,116) = .004, p = .95, η² < .001). Results
are presented in Figure 1.
Moreover, informing participants about the objective
probability of winning reduced their statements of this
objective probability (M = 21.54%, SE = 3.04 vs M =
9.53%, SE = 1.84; F(1,114) = 11.482, p = .001, η² = .092).
However, in both cases these statements regarding
objective probability were still significantly higher than
the objective 4% (t(57) = 5.754, p < .001 in the groups
without explicit information, and t(59) = 3.008, p = .004 in
the groups with explicit information). There was no effect
of stimulus familiarity on objective probability statements
(M = 13.43%, SE = 2.30 vs M = 17.44%, SE = 2.87;
F(1,114) = 1.273, p = .262, η² = .011) nor was the interaction
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term Information * Familiarity significant (F(1,114) = .023,
p = .881, η² < .001).
Participants estimated their own chances of winning
as higher than the objective probability both in the groups
without explicit information about probability (M =
40.05%, SD = 26.37 vs M = 21.54%, SD = 23.22; t(57) =
5.39; p < .001) and in the groups with explicitly stated
probability(M = 21.62%, SD = 19.6 vs M = 9.5%, SD =
14.25; t(59) = 5.55, p < .001).
Gender did not influence the perceived chances of
winning (M = 34.9, SD = 30.9 vs. M = 30.0, SD = 23.5 for
men and women, respectively; t(25.136) = .690, p = .497).
Moreover, there were no significant differences of gender
proportions across groups (χ2(1, N = 120) = .519, p = .471
for Information about probability; χ2(1, N = 120) = .058,
p = .810 for Stimulus familiarity.
Locus of Control weakly positively correlated with
the participants’ estimated chances of winning (Kendall’s
tau-b correlation; τ = .15; p = .025). LoC did not correlate
with participants’ statements of objective probability of
winning (τ = .118, p = .099), nor did the participants in the
two groups (with- and without direct information about
chances) differ in their LoC (t(117) = .225, p = .822).
DISCUSSION
Results of Experiment 1 strongly indicate that
information about objective probability of winning a lot-
tery reduces the illusion of control measured as one’s
perceived chances at winning. This is in tune with the
assumptions by Bouts & Van Avermaet (1992) that
focusing one’s attention on the random aspects of a situa-
tion causes them to be more reflective and therefore avoid
illusory control. This result alone would also support the
control heuristic and representativeness hypothesis – even
though objective chances are easy to calculate, we would
rather estimate our chances based on perceived elements
representative of a controllable situation. Moreover, while
the results regarding the objective probability of winning
may seem trivial (stating a probability makes it easy to
answer the question about this probability), they also
indicate two important things: (1) that participants do not
use the explicitly stated number of cards and number of
winning cards as information about objective probability
(even though chances of 1 in 25 and of 4% are the same
information), which further supports the control heuristic
and representativeness hypothesis and the fact that we
ignore base probabilities, and (2) that even when this
objective probability is stated, participants still over-
estimate it, which may indicate that either the situational
elements of control influence the statements of objective
probability even if it is stated, or that participants do not
understand (or cannot reproduce) percentage probabilities
(see Gigerenzer, 2003). Therefore perhaps these percen-
tages should be swapped for frequencies or a graphical
representation.
An interesting result is the lack of effect of stimulus
familiarity on the perceived chances, which is inconsistent
with Langer’s results and existing replications. One
explanation may be that the present study used 25 cards
and the Polish alphabet contains 32 letters, while Langer
used all of the 26 letters of the English alphabet. One can
note that in Langer’s research the ‘familiar stimulus’
condition contained the complete set of letters, while eso-
teric symbols could be considered an incomplete set
(unless someone assumes that there exist no more than 26
abstract esoteric symbols), while the present study offered
two incomplete sets. One could further postulate that if the
computer was to generate a letter and all letters would be
present on the cards, there is no chance that none of the
cards will win – which is not necessarily true for esoteric
symbols. Participants may assume that there is a risk of
being cheated by the experimenter – a thing noted by Al-
-Najjar & Weinstein (2009) as a possible explanation for
the Ellsberg paradox. This effect could also explain the
results by Bouts & Van Avermaet (1992), who also used
a complete set (52 standard playing cards) vs. a ‘weird’ set
of cards with Egyptian motifs, which could very well be an
incomplete set. The hypothesis that a complete set is
needed to induce the stimulus familiarity effect on illusion
of control will be investigated in Experiment 2 below.
Locus of control weakly positively correlated with
illusion of control, which is in tune with research by Hong
& Chiu (1988) and Tobias-Webb et al. (2017), which show
that external locus of control is related to higher illusory
control. On the other hand, the control heuristic model
(Thompson et al., 1998) would rather predict that internal
locus of control be related with higher illusory control,
since internal LoC makes one more sensitive to perceiving
the relation between own actions and consequences.
EXPERIMENT 2
The aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate the findings
of Experiment 1 regarding the influence of explicitly stated
information about the objective probability of winning on
the illusion of control. Moreover, we wanted to investigate
whether the lack of differences between familiar and
unfamiliar stimuli could be explained by stimulus set
completeness. Therefore we modified Experiment 1 to
include 32 cards with letters of the Polish alphabet (i.e. the
complete set of letters) vs. 32 cards with runes. Since
percentage probabilities used in Experiment 1 led to over-
estimation of the same percentage probabilities in the
groups which received explicit information, we used
frequencies and a graphical representation instead. We
expected that these changes would lead to (1) a significant
difference in the illusion of control between the complete
(familiar) and incomplete (unfamiliar) set, and (2) a further
reduction of illusion of control in the groups with explicit
information about probability.
Moreover, since locus of control only weakly
correlated with illusion of control, we instead investigated
the relations between self-esteem, narcissism and illusory
control. Research shows that competence leads to an actual
increase in the probability of achieving one’s goals, which
could also lead to a higher expectancy of success in
random chance tasks (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Abele
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& Wojciszke, 2014; Peeters, 2001). People who perceive
themselves as agentic (competent), feel a higher level of
control, and thus have a higher self-esteem. We therefore
expected high self-esteem to positively correlate with
illusion of control. Lakey et al. (2008) showed that
narcissists are more likely to gamble and make risky
choices, partly due to their high self-esteem and self-
confidence. We therefore also expected narcissism to
positively correlate with illusion of control
We also measured participants’ gambling behavior
and motives. Although participants were students, one
cannot rule out significant differences in gambling be-
havior and motivations leading to it, which could
potentially lead either to different interpretations of games
of chance and the related objective probabilities of
winning, and/or to differences in illusion of control.
Research shows that occasional gamblers do it mainly for
personal enjoyment and have a rational understanding of
the associated risk, while disordered gamblers do it to
reduce tension and can get ‘carried away’ (Niewiadomska
et al., 2014). Therefore we expected that the Social
gambling motive would be negatively correlated with the
expected chances of winning (as the person does not
actually play to win), while the Coping motive would be




One hundred and twenty participants (94 women and
26 men) aged 18-26 (M = 20.15, SD = 1.338). Recruitment
criteria and method were identical as in Experiment 1, to
make results comparable.
Materials and methods
Experiment 2 employed the same method as Experi-
ment 1 (card raffle with a computerized instruction and
randomly generated winning card), with the following
changes: (1) instead of 25 cards, 32 cards were presented
to the participants on the table, and contained either all
letters of the Polish alphabet, or 32 different runic
symbols. Lottery winnings were still 5 PLN; (2) instead
of an information that “the probability of winning this
lottery is 4%”, we informed participants that “statistically,
one in thirty-two people will win this lottery” along with
a pictogram representing 32 human silhouettes, one of
which was colored red to indicate the winner. In the
treatments with familiar stimuli, we explicitly stated that
all the letters of the Polish alphabet were present on the
table; (3) in tune with Al-Najjar & Weinstein (2009) we
added a question asking participants whether they felt they
could have been cheated in the experiment, and if so, why.
Instead of the I-E scale, we used the Single-Item Self-
Esteem Scale (SISE) (Robins, Hendin, Trzesniewski,
2001; own translation) and the Narcissistic Personality
Inventory-13 (NPI-13) (Gentile et al., 2013; Polish
adaptation: Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2018). We also
asked about what types of gambling the participants had
experience with, and measured gambling motives using the
Gambling Motives Questionnaire (GMQ) (Stewart, Zack,
2008; Polish adaptation: Niewiadomska et al., 2014).
The procedure was identical as in Experiment 1.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four
conditions in a 2x2 plan (set completeness+familiarity
x explicit information). They received instructions on-
screen, chose their card, stated their perceived chances of
winning, then after the winning card was drawn they
answered the question about the objective chances and
filled out the SISE, NPI-13 and GMQ questionnaires.
RESULTS
Explicitly stated information about objective prob-
ability significantly reduced participants’ perceived
chances of winning (M = 35.93%, SE = 2.96 vs M =
14.38%, SE = 1.78; F(1,116) = 38.425, p < .001, η² = 2.49).
Like stimulus familiarity, set completeness+familiarity had
no effect on perceived chances (M = 26.25%, SE = 2.91 vs
M = 24.07%, SE = 2.71; F(1,116) = .394, p = .531, η² =
.003) nor was the interaction term Set completeness
x familiarity significant (F(1,116) = .060, p = .807, η² =
.001). Results are presented in Figure 2.
Moreover, information about objective probability
significantly reduced the participants’ statements about
what they consider the objective probability to be (M =
10.75%, SE = 1.79 vs M = 3.54%, SE = .33; F(1,114) =
19.375, p < .001, η² = .149). The objective probability
estimated/stated by participants who received the explicit
information was not different from the actual chances of
3.125% (t(57) = 1.263; p = .212). This may indicate that
presenting chances as frequencies and pictograms was
more effective than presenting them as percentages.
Participants both in the groups with- and without
explicit information, overestimated their perceived
chances of winning (not their estimates of objective
probability) as compared to the mathematical objective
probability (M = 36.5%, SD = 23.03, vs M=10.7%, SD =
13.53; t(56) = 8.17; p < .001 in the group without explicit
information; M = 14%, SD = 13.77 vs M = 3.5%, SD =
2.52; t(57) = 5.99, p < .001 in the group with explicit
information). This would indicate that despite explicit,
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understandable information about objective chances, illu-
sion of control persevered to some extent.
Again, gender did not influence the perceived chances
of winning (M = 26.38, SD = 29.18 vs. M = 24.82, SD =
19.35 for men and women, t(118) = .258, p = .747). There
were no significant differences of gender proportions
across groups; χ2(1, N = 120) < .001, p = 1.0 for
Information about probability, χ2(1, N = 120) = 1.768, p =
.184 for Stimulus familiarity.
Perceived chances of winning weakly positively
correlated with self-esteem (Kendall’s tau-b correlation:
τ = .145; p = .042). There was no significant correlation
between perceived chances of winning and narcissism (τ =
.08; p = .211) nor with gambling motives (GMQ Social
τ = .061; p = .404; GMQ Coping τ = -.006; p = .939).
We also found no significant correlations between
statements of objective probability and narcissism (τ =
.027, p = .682), self-esteem (τ = -.011, p = .888) nor GMQ
Social (τ = -.021, p = .784) or Coping (τ = -.057, p = .488)
scales.
81.7 per cent of the participants declared partaking in
some form of gambling. The most popular were scratch-it
lotteries (87.8% of gamblers) and National Lottery (Lotto -
59.2%). Others included video game lootboxes (16.3%),
sports bets (7.1%), poker (6.1%), online casinos (5.1%),
real-life casinos and stock market trading (4.1% each) and
cryptocurrency trading (2%). We ran analyses on partici-
pants who played the national lottery, scratch-it lotteries
and used videogame lootboxes (other gambling types were
not present in enough participants for analyses). It turned
out that participants who played the national lottery did not
significantly differ in their estimates of chances (t(64.352)
= .079) nor their stated objective probability (t(62.598) =
.320). For the other comparisons, we ran Mann-Whitney U
tests (as groups were too small and uneven for t-tests) –
scratch-it lottery players did not differ from non-players
(Z = .833, p = .732 for perceived chances; Z = .342, p =
.405 for stated objective probability). However, lootbox
users estimated their chances as significantly lower than
non-users (M = 15.63, SD = 15.08 vs. M = 28.89, SD =
23.03, Z = 2.277, p = .023). The difference in stated
objective probabilities dependent on experience with
lootboxes was not significant (Z = 1.947, p = .052). We
ran analyses on participants who played the national
lottery, scratch-it lotteries and used videogame lootboxes
(other gambling types were not large enough for analyses).
It turned out that participants who played the national
lottery did not significantly differ in their estimates of
chances (t(64.352) = .079) nor their stated objective
probability (t(62.598) = .320). For the other comparisons, we
ran Mann-Whitney U tests (as groups were too small
and uneven for t-tests) – scratch-it lottery players did not
differ from non-players (Z = .833, p = .732 for perceived
chances; Z = .342, p = .405 for stated objective proba-
bility), however lootbox users estimated their chances as
significantly lower than non-users (M = 15.63, SD = 15.08
vs. M = 28.89, SD = 23.03, Z = 2.277, p = .023). The
difference for stated objective probabilities was not
significant (Z = 1.947, p = .052).
15 per cent of the participants suspected being
cheated in the lottery; most of the doubts focused on
whether the computer truly generated the winning card
randomly. Crucially, none of the participants considered
a scenario in which the card chose by the computer would
not be present on the table.
DISCUSSION
Results of both experiments indicate that informing
participants about the objective chances of winning
significantly reduces the illusion of control (measured as
perceived chances of winning), but does not completely
revert it toward objective probability. These results
indicate that both the Control Heuristic and Representa-
tiveness hypothesis, and the standard interpretation of illu-
sion of control, are partly true. When explicit information
about the probabilities of winning is not presented as
a focal point, elements of control in a situation may lead
participants to overestimate the objective chances, and
overestimate their chances even further. When such infor-
mation is provided, participants are aware of objective
chances but still overestimate their own chances of
success, which is textbook illusion of control.
Experiment 2 also showed no effect of the complete-
ness of the set on the perceived chances, and thus on the
illusion of control itself. We did not manage to replicate
Langer’s (1975) findings about the effects of stimulus
familiarity on illusion of control, nor did we achieve such
an effect for complete and incomplete sets of stimuli. On
the one hand, Langer’s sample was rather low (N = 52
divided between four treatments) which greatly limits the
robustness and generalizability of the results; on the other
hand there were successful replications of this effect
reported in published papers. Perhaps some sort of cultural
specificity of Polish people (the attitude toward lotteries,
luck or games of chance in general) may be the
explanation; however research on this specificity relative
to the illusion of control in games of chance is scarce.
Moreover, unlike previous research, we used a computer-
ized procedure and while cards were physical, the winning
card was presented on-screen. This may have led to fewer
doubts about being cheated as compared to a situation in
which the winning card is drawn by a person, therefore
knowing the symbols (letters) may no longer be considered
‘additional protection against being cheated’.
The weak positive correlation between self-esteem
and perceived chances of winning is in line with existing
research on self-esteem, competence and locus of control.
The presented research shows that explicit informa-
tion about the objective chances of winning a lottery is
able to reduce the illusion of control, but this information
must be a focal point of the task (merely presenting the
total number of tickets and the number of winning tickets
does not have such an effect – participants do not calculate
it into objective chances). Such focal information strategy
may be used to some extent in the prevention of disordered
gambling and risky behavior. Results also indicate that any
information about chances needs to be presented in the
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simplest, most obvious form possible to have an optimal
effect on decision making and behavior, in line with
Gigerenzer (2003).
Further research is needed to investigate this effect in
other contexts of illusion of control, and to investigate the
situational constraints which may prevent the stimulus
familiarity effect from appearing, potentially providing an
explanation as to its underlying mechanisms.
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